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During creative problem solving, initial solution attempts often fail because of self-
imposed constraints that prevent us from thinking out of the box. In order to solve a
problem successfully, the problem representation has to be restructured by combining
elements of available knowledge in novel and creative ways. It has been suggested that
sleep supports the reorganization of memory representations, ultimately aiding problem
solving. In this study, we systematically tested the effect of sleep and time on problem
solving, using classical insight tasks and magic tricks. Solving these tasks explicitly
requires a restructuring of the problem representation and may be accompanied by
a subjective feeling of insight. In two sessions, 77 participants had to solve classical
insight problems and magic tricks. The two sessions either occurred consecutively or
were spaced 3 h apart, with the time in between spent either sleeping or awake. We
found that sleep affected neither general solution rates nor the number of solutions
accompanied by sudden subjective insight. Our study thus adds to accumulating
evidence that sleep does not provide an environment that facilitates the qualitative
restructuring of memory representations and enables problem solving.
Keywords: information processing, sleep/wake cognition, sleep andmemory, problem solving, insight, incubation
INTRODUCTION
When facing a difficult problem, we often get the advice to “let it rest” or “sleep on it.” Indeed,
some studies support the view that a period of incubation can subserve problem solving, and it has
recently been suggested that sleep may particularly contribute to this psychological function. It is,
however, still a matter of debate under which conditions such beneficial effects occur.
When attempting to solve a problem, the individual elements that constitute the task have to be
represented in memory and integrated with prior knowledge to arrive at a solution. This process
can either be based on analytic reasoning, which leads to a solution in an incremental step-by-step
manner, or the solution may emerge as a result of sudden insight (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003;
Gilhooly, 2016; Llewellyn, 2016). Even though it is difficult to pinpoint the phenomenon of insight
and to define exact criteria of insight tasks (Chronicle et al., 2004; Helie and Sun, 2010), it seems
clear that insight involves a change in the representation of a cognitive concept (Ohlsson, 1992;
Kounios and Beeman, 2014).
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Importantly, insight requires recombining memory and
knowledge elements in an innovative, non-obvious fashion by
flexibly switching between different associations (Kounios and
Beeman, 2014). Öllinger et al. (2014) propose a multi-stage model
of representational change during insight problem solving that
divides the process into distinct, but dependent stages. First,
different solutions are attempted (1) which lead to consistent
failure (2). This creates an impasse (3). Only by restructuring the
problem representation (4) can insight (Aha!) occur (5) and a
solution (6) be reached (Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al., 1999).
Accordingly, reaching an impasse increases the likelihood of a
later insight experience and subsequent solution of the problem.
The better participants could reach the boundaries of their initial
solution space, the easier it was for them to overcome them in
a second step. When a first problem representation is created
and no solution can be found within the assumed problem
space, the original problem representation has to be modified
by representational change. This change requires relaxing self-
imposed constraints on applicable knowledge (Ohlsson, 1992;
Knoblich et al., 1999). Other conceptualizations of insight
problem solving follow a similar logic, but emphasize that the
problem space is initially kept as small as possible and will only
modified if no satisfactory progress can be made (Ormerod et al.,
2013). Together, both theories share the view that constraints
on applicable knowledge are modified during insight problem
solving.
Phenomenologically, solving a complex problem is often
accompanied by an Aha! experience, meaning that the solution
arises in an unexpected, sudden manner, is experienced as
obviously correct, and elicits a positive emotional response
(Kaplan and Simon, 1990; Gick and Lockhart, 1995; Bowden
et al., 2005; Subramaniam et al., 2009; Topolinski and Reber,
2010; Danek et al., 2014; Salvi et al., 2016; Danek and
Wiley, 2017). Furthermore, the solution is often preceded by
a period of feeling stuck and might therefore be driven by
unconscious processing (Bowden et al., 2005). Indeed, qualitative
and quantitative reviews have come to the conclusion that a
period during which a problem is set aside, termed incubation,
is beneficial for insight problem solving (Dodds et al., 2003; Sio
and Ormerod, 2009).
Many studies investigate insight problem solving with the
remote associates test (RAT) and observe that a period of
incubation improves performance (Mednick et al., 1964; Dodds
et al., 2002; Vul and Pashler, 2007). According to Gilhooly (2016),
these incubation benefits might be facilitated by automated
spreading of activation along associative links, coupled with
an active but below-threshold goal representation. In line with
this assumption, it has been shown that a prime can spark
later insight (Cai et al., 2009). Alternatively, activation of neural
traces representing unsuccessful solution attempts might decay
over a period of incubation, making a relaxation of previous
constraints and consequent activation of novel networks more
likely (Öllinger et al., 2008).
In principle, sleep offers a period of brain isolation that could
have similar benefits as an incubation period in wakefulness.
Additionally, sleep might even aid the restructuring of a problem
representation by qualitatively transforming memories (Stickgold
and Walker, 2013). It has been established that sleep has a
positive effect on the stabilization of newly acquired memory
content, meaning that it helps to preserve stored information
(Gais and Born, 2004; Schabus et al., 2004; Diekelmann and
Born, 2010; Rasch and Born, 2013; Schönauer et al., 2014b).
The standard model of memory consolidation assumes that
by repetitive reactivation of hippocampo-cortical networks
during sleep, initially hippocampal-dependent memories become
gradually integrated into cortico-cortical networks, which leads
to a reorganization of memory representations on the neural
level (Frankland and Bontempi, 2005; Takashima et al., 2006;
Gais et al., 2007). Whether and under which circumstances
this process also entails a qualitative reorganization of the
memories is currently under debate (Lewis and Durrant,
2011; Inostroza and Born, 2013; Stickgold and Walker,
2013; Ackermann and Rasch, 2014; Landmann et al., 2014).
Arguing in favor of this idea are studies that investigate
the integration of newly encoded information into existing
knowledge networks in lexical integration tasks (Tamminen
and Gaskell, 2013) and the formation of false memories for
words representing the gist of actually studied word lists, which
are induced by sleep (Payne et al., 2009; Diekelmann et al.,
2011).
Additionally, there is ample evidence that sleep can promote
the extraction of statistical regularities, for example in
probabilistic learning (Durrant et al., 2011) or in transitive
inference tasks (Ellenbogen et al., 2007), making access to
patterns and rules explicit (Stickgold and Walker, 2013). It is
assumed that repetitive reactivation of overlapping memory
representations in sleep helps to extract regularities from
multiple memories (Djonlagic et al., 2009; Lewis and Durrant,
2011). Wagner et al. (2004) investigated problem solving in
a version of the Number Reduction Task that could either be
solved analytically or via a hidden short cut rule. Subjects used
the short cut during a delayed test more often when they spent
the time after the initial confrontation with the task asleep than
when they stayed awake, indicating that knowledge of the hidden
rules governing the task improved over sleep.
Creative problem solving, contrary to memory integration,
concept formation, or rule learning, requires the ability to
disintegrate existing concepts in order to recombine memory
representations in a novel fashion (Landmann et al., 2014). So
far, a beneficial effect of sleep on this kind of problem solving
is still being discussed (Monaghan et al., 2015; Landmann et al.,
2016; Debarnot et al., 2017) and the scarce evidence yields mixed
results (Cai et al., 2009; Sio et al., 2013; Beijamini et al., 2014).
To our knowledge, the study by Beijamini et al. (2014) is the
only one that investigates the effect of sleep on a problem that
requires logical reasoning. Most other sleep studies use the RAT,
which is described as an insight problem but actually relies
more on associative processing than on the restructuring of a
problem representation. In the RAT three seemingly unrelated
words (e.g., ‘dust’/‘cereal’/‘fish’) are presented and participants
are asked to find the expression that connects those three words
(‘bowl’). Apart from a general benefit of incubation, Cai et al.
(2009) found that participants with REM sleep between sessions
had higher solution rates in the RAT than participants without
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REM sleep. In contrast, Landmann et al. (2016) did not observe
a sleep-related improvement in the closely similar Compound
Remote Associates Test, but only better memory retention for
previously solved items, supporting a primarily stabilizing role of
sleep.
The goal of the present study was to disentangle effects
of incubation and sleep on insight problem solving. Four
groups of subjects were confronted with a set of classical
problem solving tasks consisting of matchstick-algorithms, the
nine-dot problem and the eight-coin problem (Danek et al.,
2016). Furthermore, participants had to find out how several
magic tricks worked, a novel insight paradigm (Danek et al.,
2014). So far, studies on sleep and problem solving have not
addressed the nature of the solutions that were reached by the
participants (Walker et al., 2002; Cai et al., 2009; Beijamini
et al., 2014; Monaghan et al., 2015; Landmann et al., 2016).
Therefore, to be able to separate sudden solutions, which are
typical for insight problem solving, from analytical step-by-step
problem solving, we also collected qualitative data about the
participants’ subjective feeling of sudden insight, and compared
qualitative and quantitative performance measures (Danek and
Wiley, 2017). We hypothesized that an incubation period would
increase insight experiences and overall solution rates. Similar
to awake incubation, sleep keeps the brain from conscious
processing but may additionally support the restructuring
of underlying problem representations. Therefore, we further
expected that incubation during sleep would have a larger effect
than incubation during wakefulness.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 77 subjects (46 females and 31 males, mean age
23.8 ± 3.4 years [M ± SD]) participated in this experiment
in one of four groups. The sample size was based on previous
studies (e.g., Cai et al., 2009; Sio et al., 2013), which found
significant effects with average group sizes of 12–15 subjects. All
subjects were healthy and reported a regular circadian rhythm
with a sleep duration of 6–10 h. There were no extreme morning
or evening types in the sample, as assessed by the Munich
Chronotype Questionnaire (Roenneberg et al., 2007). Subjects
were selected to report no problems falling asleep in unfamiliar
environments as well as being able to sleep during the afternoon.
They had no long-distance flights within the 6 weeks preceding
the experiment. Starting two nights before the experiment,
participants filled in a sleep log, giving information about their
bed time and when they woke up. The two mornings before
the experiment, participants were instructed to wake up 1 h
earlier than usual. This mild sleep restriction was applied to
facilitate falling asleep in an afternoon nap (Schönauer et al.,
2014b; Studte et al., 2015). Sleep recordings from two participants
were defective, but online EEG surveillance assured that those
participants were able to fall asleep and their data were still
included in group-level statistics. Data from nine participants
were missing for the magic tricks because of technical problems
with the audio recording. Nine participants reported prior
knowledge of the nine-dot problem and were excluded from the
analysis of the classical insight tasks.
Testing Material
Magic Tricks
In the first task, participants were shown 10 short (19.5 s± 10.5 s
[M± SD]) video clips of magic tricks and instructed to figure out
the rationale behind them (“Please try to find out how the trick
works!”). Tricks were performed by a professional magician and
recorded in a standardized setting. Stimulus development and the
experimental rationale behind using magic tricks as insight tasks
are described in detail elsewhere (Danek et al., 2014). Each trick
was based on one single technique (e.g., misdirection, sleight-of-
hand) and had one specific effect (e.g., disappearance, telekinesis;
see Table 1). Furthermore, the tricks were difficult to see through,
with a solution rate of less than 10% after the first presentation
(Danek et al., 2014). Instructions for the task as well as the video
clips were presented on a 23-inch computer screen. Participants’
answers with their suggested explanation of the magic trick were
recorded by the computer.
Matchstick Arithmetic Task
In matchstick arithmetic tasks (see Figure 1A), participants
are presented with incorrect arithmetic equations, with roman
numerals and operators depicted as combinations of matchsticks.
The correct solution requires moving one single matchstick to
correct the equation. The problem employed in this study was
taken from a group of previously used matchstick arithmetic
tasks (Öllinger et al., 2008). In this case “VIII = VI – II” has to
be transformed to “VIII – VI = II” by moving one matchstick
from the equal sign on top of the minus sign. The task was
depicted on a sheet of paper as well as with real matchsticks.
Participants moved the matchsticks, but could return to the start
configuration at any time.
Nine-Dot Problem
This classical task (Scheerer, 1963) requires 9 dots in a 3 × 3
grid to be connected with 4 straight lines, without lifting the
pen from the paper (see Figure 1B). In the correct solution, the
lines extend beyond the boundaries of the grid (Kershaw and
Ohlsson, 2004). Participants were presented with the dots (each
with one centimeter diameter) depicted on a sheet of paper and
drew the lines directly on the sheet. Material was provided for
three drawing attempts.
Eight-Coin Problem
In the eight-coin problem the coins are arranged in two slightly
shifted rows of four coins each (see Figure 1C) (Ormerod et al.,
2002). The subject has to find a constellation where each coin
touches exactly three other coins by moving exactly two coins.
The solution consists of two clusters of three coins each with a
fourth coin resting on top of each cluster. Eight 20-cent coins
were spread out on a table. Participants were allowed to touch the
coins and move them around during the problem solving process.
The initial arrangement of the coins was always visible on a sheet
of paper, so that they could get back to the start configuration at
any time.
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TABLE 1 | The 10 magic tricks.
Magic trick Effect Description
Vanishing coin Vanish Out of three coins, one vanishes.
Rubik’s cube Transformation An unsolved Rubik’s cube is solved after being tossed into the air.
Ketchup bottle Vanish A ketchup bottle is put in a bag and disappears.
Match through match Penetration One matchstick wanders through another one without breaking it.
Salt Vanish Salt is poured in the fist from where it disappears.
Torn and restored card Restoration A card is ripped in pieces and restored.
Water to ice Transformation Water is poured into a mug and transformed into an ice cube.
Floating bun Telekinesis (Levitation) A bun is covered by a napkin and starts to float.
Bowling ball Topological impossibility (size) A large bowling ball is carried in a thin suitcase.
Shuffled/Unshuffled Telekinesis Cards are seen mixed face-up/face-down, before all facing the same way (as if they had
turned over by themselves).
General Procedure
Experimental procedures were approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Department of Psychology at Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universität München, and participants gave written
informed consent. In a 3-h daytime sleep vs. wake × incubation
vs. no incubation design, four groups of participants worked
on the two types of problem solving tasks described above.
Subjects were assigned to the groups randomly as they
were recruited. It was, however, assured that all groups
had a final sample size of 19 or 20 subjects. The tasks
were presented in a standardized fashion in a soundproof
chamber with no experimenter present. Instructions were
given exclusively on the computer screen or on paper. Spoken
solutions were recorded in the magic tricks task. The classical
problem solving tasks were solved by the subject with the
material provided (matchsticks, paper, coins) and left in the
experimental chamber. Accordingly, no interaction between
subjects and experimenters was necessary during the problem
solving tasks. This was done to prevent Rosenthal effects of
experimenter expectancy. This is particularly important in
insight tasks, because even subtle and inadvertent hints or
differences in instructions can strongly influence solution
probability.
Participants attempted to solve the problems first during
a short initial encoding phase and then again during a
second solution attempt during a longer retesting phase.
Two experimental groups were subjected to a 4h-incubation
interval spent asleep (sleep incubation, s_inc+) or awake (wake
incubation, w_inc+) between initial problem encoding and retest
phase. Two control groups spent an interval asleep (sleep no
incubation, s_inc−) or awake (wake no incubation, w_inc−)
before initial encoding. This first solution attempt was then
immediately followed by the retest phase (Figure 2). Three
hour sleep periods started 30 min after the s_inc+ group
encoded the task. Sleep was followed by a 30-min wake-up phase
before further testing. Sleep was surveilled by EEG recording.
Participants in the wake groups stayed in the laboratory under
the supervision of the experimenters and were not allowed
to sleep or eat. To prevent them from thinking about the
problems, they spent the time reading magazines and playing
board games with the experimenters. Videos, instructions and
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of the three tasks used to investigate the
process of insight problem solving. (A) Matchstick arithmetics: Here the
mathematical expression depicted in the first line has to be transformed to a
correct mathematical expression by moving matchsticks around. (B) Nine-dot
problem: In this task, participants have to connect the nine dots with four
straight lines without lifting the pen from the paper. (C) Eight-coin problem:
Here, the eight coins in the first row have to be moved in a way that each coin
touches exactly three other coins.
experimental timing were implemented in the Matlab toolbox
Cogent 2000.
The first solution attempt served as a period to encode
the problem representations. For the magic tricks, participants
were given standardized audiotaped instructions and viewed
each of the randomly presented video clips once. After
each video, participants were given 30 s to consider a
solution. Then they could provide their possible solution
by speaking into a microphone. Subsequently, the three
classical insight tasks were brought into the room by the
experimenter. After reading the instructions, participants had
at maximum 1 min per problem to come up with a solution.
The problems were always presented in the same order
(matchstick arithmetic, nine-dot problem, eight-coin problem).
After each magic trick and problem, participants were asked
to indicate whether they had already known the solution
beforehand.
During the second solution attempt, each of the ten magic
tricks was shown twice, regardless of whether it had been solved
during the initial phase. The procedure was similar to the initial
phase: after each magic trick, participants had the possibility
to attempt a solution. Classical insight tasks that had been
solved during the initial phase were not presented again in
the retesting phase. For the remaining problems, participants
were given up to 5 min to find a solution. After every magic
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FIGURE 2 | Study design. All subjects stayed in the laboratory from 2 pm to 7 pm. The two experimental groups sleep incubation (s_inc+) and wake incubation
(w_inc+) experienced a 3-h incubation period between initial encoding and retest. Both control groups (s_inc- and w_inc-) did not experience an incubation period,
but the sleep no incubation group (s_inc–) slept for 3 h before encoding and retest. EEG: application of EEG electrodes.
trick and problem, participants stated whether the solution came
to their minds in a step-wise or in a sudden manner and
whether the solution had already appeared during the incubation
period.
Polysomnography
Sleep data was recorded in the sleep lab using
electroencephalography (EEG) at C3 and C4 electrode positions
according to the 10–20 system. In addition, bipolar horizontal
and vertical electrooculography (EOG) and electromyography
(EMG) of the chin was recorded. Data was sampled at a
rate of 250 Hz. Reference and ground electrodes were
placed on the nose and on the forehead, respectively. All
channels were notch-filtered at 50 Hz. Additionally, EEG
channels were filtered between 0.5 and 30 Hz, a 10 Hz low
pass filter was applied to the EOG channels and a 25 Hz
high pass filter was applied to the EMG. All recordings
were scored oﬄine in 30 s epochs by two independent
raters and disagreements were resolved by a third rater
according to the standard criteria by Kales and Rechtschaffen
(1968).
Statistical Analysis
We calculated solution rates by dividing the number of
correct answers by the number of previously unknown and
unsolved tasks, separately for the magic tricks and the classical
insight problems. Solutions for the magic tricks were rated by
two independent raters. An answer was counted as correct,
when both raters agreed. Following guidelines by Viera and
Garrett (2005), inter-observer agreement was high (Cohen’s
K initial phase = 0.93; Cohen’s K retest phase = 0.87).
Analyses of variances were done in SPSS 21 and were
based on ranked dependent variables when the Levene-
Test indicated lacking homogeneity of variances. Additionally,
we conducted non-parametric X2 tests when values of the
dependent variable were dichotomous. Significance was reached
at a two-sided level of α = 0.05. All values are given as
mean ± standard error of the mean (M ± SEM) if not indicated
otherwise.
RESULTS
Magic Tricks
None of the participants knew the solution to any of the 10
magic tricks beforehand. Participants solved 2.66 ± 0.21 magic
tricks in the initial phase. Importantly, groups did not differ
in their initial performance as shown by a 2 × 2 ANOVA
with the factors following incubation (F1,64 = 0.734, p = 0.395,
η2p = 0.011) and following state (sleep/wake: F1,64 = 0.479,
p = 0.492, η2p = 0.007; interaction: F1,64 = 0.194, p = 0.661,
η2p = 0.003; Figure 3).
In the retest phase, participants solved an additional
1.40 ± 0.13 tricks. The ANOVA on the rate of additionally
solved tricks showed that neither incubation nor sleep led
to better performance (incubation: F1,64 = 0.008, p = 0.930,
η2p < 0.001; state: F1,64 = 0.047, p = 0.829, η2p = 0.001; interaction:
F1,64 = 0.149, p = 0.701, η2p = 0.002; Table 2).
In addition to the quantitative analyses above, we investigated
possible qualitative differences of the problem solving process.
Of all correct solutions, 54 ± 6.3% were solved with insight
(as measured by the subjectively reported suddenness in the
emergence of the solution). When specifically looking at those
tricks that were solved with insight, we saw that a period of
incubation numerically, but non-significantly aided performance
in the retest phase (incubation: F1,46 = 2.305, p = 0.136,
η2p = 0.048; state: F1,46 = 0.139, p = 0.711, η2p = 0.003; interaction:
F1,46 = 0.060, p = 0.807, η2p = 0.001; Figure 3).
Sleep groups s_inc+ and s_inc− did not differ in the length
of S1 (t34 = 0.482, p = 0.633), S2 (t34 = 0.629, p = 0.533),
SWS (t34 = −1.594, p = 0.120), REM sleep (t34 = −1.459,
p = 0.154), total sleep time (TST; t34 =−1.409, p = 0.168), or wake
(t34 = 0.065, p = 0.227; Table 3).
We did not observe any significant correlation between the
time spent in specific sleep stages and performance on the magic
tricks (see Table 4). As REM sleep has been suggested to play a
specific role in creative problem solving (Cai et al., 2009), we also
tested whether participants with REM sleep (n = 7; 20.6 ± 4.7%
of magic tricks solved) performed better than did participants
without REM sleep (n = 9; 19.8 ± 6.7% of magic tricks solved).
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Number of solved tricks after the initial and retest phase. (B) Retest performance rates for the magic tricks for groups with incubation (inc+) and
without incubation (inc–). (C) Percentages of solved tricks that were solved with insight instead of analytical step-by-step problem solving. Here, we observe a
numerical difference between the experimental and control groups, with incubation increasing the number of tricks solved with insight.
TABLE 2 | Performance in the initial and retest phase on the magic tricks.
Group (n) Number of tricks solved
during the initial phase
Additionally solved tricks
during the retest phase
Net performance increase
(%)
Overall solution rate
(%)
s_inc+ (17) 2.24 ± 0.43 1.35 ± 0.27 19.00 ± 4.09 35.88 ± 5.50
s_inc− (15) 2.66 ± 0.41 1.47 ± 0.26 20.94 ± 3.91 41.33 ± 4.96
w_inc+ (19) 2.74 ± 0.42 1.42 ± 0.26 21.64 ± 4.16 41.58 ± 5.48
w_inc− (17) 3.00 ± 0.43 1.35 ± 0.27 20.25 ± 4.01 43.53 ± 5.00
TABLE 3 | Minutes (M ± SD) spent in sleep stages.
Group (n) Sleep stage
S1 S2 SWS REM TSTa Wake
s_inc+ (19) 33.03 ± 22.31 41.10 ± 20.56 37.13 ± 22.36 10.13 ± 12.86 121.39 ± 27.75 28.58 ± 27.70
s_inc− (17) 29.44 ± 22.29 36.79 ± 20.48 50.32 ± 27.27 16.67 ± 14.06 133.24 ± 21.93 18.88 ± 17.94
aTST, total sleep time.
TABLE 4 | Correlations between memory performance measures and specific sleep stages in s_inc+.
S1 S2 SWS REM TSTa Wake
Retest solution rates of the magic tricks
r 0.178 −0.191 −0.065 0.003 −0.060 −0.008
p 0.510 0.479 0.810 0.990 0.826 0.976
Percentage of tricks correctly solved with insight
r −0.341 0.184 −0.226 0.040 −0.158 0.185
p 0.277 0.568 0.480 0.901 0.625 0.565
aTST, total sleep time.
Again, we did not see an effect of REM sleep on performance
(t14 = 0.091, p = 0.929).
Classical Problem Solving Tasks
The three classical problems have, as expected, different levels
of difficulty: 45.5 ± 5.7% of participants could already solve
the matchstick algorithms after the initial phase. The nine-dot
problem and the eight-coin paradigm had initial solution rates
of 6.0± 2.9% and 8.0± 3.1%, respectively (Table 5).
We first assessed whether the four experimental groups
differed with regard to solution rates in the initial phase,
during which the problem representation was formed. ANOVA
revealed neither a main effect of following state (F1,73 = 2.521,
p = 0.117, η2p = 0.033) nor a main effect of following incubation
(F1,73 = 0.484, p = 0.489, η2p = 0.007) on solution rates,
calculated as the number of solved problems divided by the
number of unknown problems. There was also no specific benefit
of spending the following incubation period asleep as shown
by a non-significant interaction between state and incubation
(F1,73 = 0.039, p = 0.845, η2p = 0.001; Figure 4A).
To answer the question whether incubation or sleep aid
creative problem solving, we compared solution rates in the
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TABLE 5 | Solution rates (M ± SEM) for the three classical insight tasks in the
initial and the retest phase.
Matchsticks (%) Nine-dot (%) Eight-coin (%)
s_inc+
Initial 40.0 ± 11.2 0.0 ± 0.0 5.0 ± 5.0
Retest 66.7 ± 14.2 36.8 ± 11.4 21.1 ± 9.6
s_inc−
Initial 39.0 ± 11.8 9.0 ± 9.1 0.0 ± 0.0
Retest 72.7 ± 14.1 20.0 ± 13.3 33.3 ± 11.4
w_inc+
Initial 48.0 ± 11.2 10 ± 6.6 10.0 ± 6.6
Retest 90.9 ± 9.1 26.3 ± 10.4 42.1 ± 11.6
w_inc−
Initial 56.0 ± 12.1 6.0 ± 5.9 17.0 ± 9.0
Retest 87.5 ± 12.5 31.3 ± 12.0 33.3 ± 12.6
retest phase. Problems that had not yet been solved were
presented again, but this time for 5 min instead of one. Again,
we neither observed an effect of incubation (F1,73 = 0.131,
p = 0.719, η2p = 0.002) nor an effect of state (F1,73 = 0.641,
p = 0.426, η2p = 0.009) on the solution rate. Furthermore, we
could not observe the expected interaction between both factors
(F1,73 = 0.006, p = 0.939, η2p < 0.001; Figure 4B). In our study,
incubation between two solution attempts therefore does not
support problem solving, regardless of whether this time is spent
awake or asleep.
Individual insight problems differed largely with regard to
difficulty. In addition to looking at the combined performance
measure of all three insight tasks, we used the Chi-squared
test to investigate each individual problem separately in three
additional exploratory analyses. We found no differences
regarding retest performance between the four groups in the
matchstick arithmetic (X2 = 2.607, df = 3, p = 0.456, N = 42),
the nine-dot paradigm (X2 = 1.038, df = 3, p = 0.792, N = 64)
or the eight-coin paradigm (X2 = 1.947, df = 3, p = 0.583,
N = 71).
We also investigated whether sleep or incubation had an
effect on the number of insight experiences. 66% of the
correct matchstick arithmetic tasks, 42% of the correct nine-
dot problems and 47% of the correct eight-coin problems
were achieved with subjectively reported insight. However,
there was neither an effect of sleep nor of incubation on
the number of insight-related correct solutions (incubation:
F1,47 = 0.188, p = 0.667, η2p = 0.004; state: F1,47 = 0.217,
p = 0.644, η2p = 0.005; interaction: F1,47 = 0.011, p = 0.916;
η2p < 0.001; Figure 4C). As shown in Table 6, there were
no significant correlations between the time spent in different
sleep stages and the ability to find solutions to the tasks
or the likelihood to solve a problem with insight. When
comparing sleep periods with REM sleep (40.0± 7.9% of classical
problems solved) to sleep without REM sleep (35.2 ± 10.9%
of classical problems solved), we also found no difference
in retest performance on the classical tasks (t17 = 0.362,
p = 0.722).
FIGURE 4 | (A) Performance after the first (black bars) and the second (white bars) encounters. Note that the maximum number of tricks to be solved was 3.
(B) Retest solution rates. As the insight tasks were not presented again when they had been solved in the initial phase, 100% represents having solved all remaining
insight tasks. (C) Percentage of tasks that were solved with insight.
TABLE 6 | Correlations between memory performance measures and specific sleep stages in s_inc+.
S1 S2 SWS REM TSTa Wake
Retest solution rates of the classical problems
r 0.477 −0.307 −0.211 −0.297 −0.151 0.311
p 0.039∗ 0.201 0.387 0.216 0.537 0.195
Percentage of classical problems correctly solved with insight
r −0.002 0.270 −0.226 −0.285 −0.073 0.100
p 0.994 0.396 0.480 0.418 0.823 0.758
aTST, total sleep time. ∗Significance thresholds after Bonferroni correction: p ≤ 0.008 when correcting for separate tests on sleep stages within each dependent measure,
p ≤ 0.004 when correcting for all tests in table.
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DISCUSSION
In this study, we tested the effect of incubation and sleep on
solving classical insight problems (Danek et al., 2016) as well as
magic tricks (Danek et al., 2014). Previous work has not directly
tested whether incubation or sleep affect tasks that critically
require a restructuring of the problem representation. Using a
daytime sleep versus wake design, we aimed at disentangling
effects on both quantitative as well as qualitative measures of
insight problem solving. We found that neither an incubation
period nor sleep aided the solution of classical problems or magic
tricks.
Regarding incubation, we did not find any significant effects
on quantitative or qualitative measures of insight problem solving
for either of the two tasks. Only numerically, more magic tricks
were solved with sudden insight after an incubation period
compared to no incubation. Recent meta-analyses report small
to medium sized effects for incubation in insight problem solving
(Dodds et al., 2003; Sio and Ormerod, 2009; Strick et al., 2011;
Gilhooly, 2016). Interestingly, a remarkable number of studies
do not, or only partly, report incubation effects (Segal, 2004;
Bowden et al., 2005; Vul and Pashler, 2007; Weisberg, 2015). This
may indicate that certain tasks profit more from incubation than
others. In line with this, Gilhooly (2016) suggests that spreading
activation is the main mechanism underlying incubation effects.
Indeed, the RAT, which is frequently used to study problem
solving (Mednick et al., 1964; Smith and Blankenship, 1991;
Dodds et al., 2002; Vul and Pashler, 2007; Sio et al., 2013;
Landmann et al., 2016) has been linked to spreading activation
(Topolinski and Reber, 2010; Kounios and Beeman, 2014). The
tasks we use in the present study, however, require different
resources than finding remote associates. Here, the unconscious
activation of broad semantic networks will not be sufficient
to facilitate problem solving. Instead, the representation of the
problem (i.e., the implicit constraints on the solution space in
the insight tasks and the limiting presuppositions regarding the
magic tricks) has to be restructured in order to successfully
solve the task (Danek et al., 2014, 2016; Öllinger et al., 2014).
Our results indicate that incubation alone may not support the
restructuring of problem representations.
Concerning the role of sleep, it has been suggested that it may
support the qualitative restructuring of problem representations
that is needed for insight problem solving (Diekelmann and Born,
2010; Stickgold and Walker, 2013). A reactivation of recently
encoded material in the hippocampus is assumed to gradually
incorporate new material into preexisting cortical mnemonic
networks, possibly also forming the basis for a qualitative
restructuring of memory representations. It is unclear, whether
the reorganization of hippocampal and neocortical memory
traces also entails a change in overt behavioral responses (Orban
et al., 2006; Deliens et al., 2013; Durrant et al., 2013; Landmann
et al., 2014). A couple of studies have investigated the effect of
sleep on problem solving ability (Wagner et al., 2004; Cai et al.,
2009; Sio et al., 2013; Beijamini et al., 2014; Landmann et al.,
2016). Regarding tasks that require a restructuring of mental
representations, evidence for a role of sleep is mixed. Recently,
Debarnot et al. (2017) only partly replicated an effect of sleep
on gaining knowledge of a hidden abstract rule in the above
mentioned Number Reduction Task (Wagner et al., 2004). Using
the same design as that study, they found a benefit of sleep in
young, but not in older participants. Wagner and colleagues also
did not replicate the high solution rates after sleep in another
study (Verleger et al., 2013). All three studies did not report
measures to prevent experimenter expectancy effects. Beijamini
et al. (2014) investigated the effect of sleep on a logical reasoning
game that requires restructuring and insight. At the point when
subjects did not know how to proceed to a higher level, half of
them were allowed to sleep for a nap while the other half stayed
awake. The nap significantly increased the chance of solving the
level on which they had previously been stuck. Unfortunately,
performance rates prior to the incubation interval are not shown,
which makes interpretation of results more uncertain.
On the other hand, there seems to be stronger evidence for a
role of sleep in solving associative tasks. Sio et al. (2013) found in
the RAT a benefit of sleep for difficult, but not for easy problems.
These difficult problems have weaker direct associations between
stimulus and target and require a stronger spread of activation to
activate the solution, which is a function that can be supported
by sleep (Stickgold et al., 1999). Cai et al. (2009) found that the
occurrence of REM sleep increased the chance to find remote
associates in the RAT, but only if the correct solution had been
primed before sleep. Landmann et al. (2016) did not replicate the
finding by Sio et al. (2013), using the similar Compound Remote
Associates Test. In their study, a period of sleep did not increase
the likelihood of correctly solving previously primed RAT items.
All of these findings point toward a sleep-dependent spread of
activation that benefits the strengthening of available solutions,
but less toward a restructuring of knowledge during sleep. In the
present study, solution rates as well as the subjective quality of
the solution in the sense of an Aha! experience did not show any
effect of sleep. Thus, there is a growing body of evidence showing
that sleep does not generally promote the restructuring of newly
encoded problems in memory. It may support this process only,
e.g., if a spread of associative information or a strengthening
of the existing memory representation are sufficient to improve
performance. Consequently, our results do not reinforce the
notion that sleep-inherent reactivation of newly encoded material
and the resulting systems memory consolidation affect problem
restructuring and the recombination of knowledge elements
required for insightful problem solving.
Performance rates and ratios between insight and non-insight
solutions in our experiment are comparable to published studies
testing the same paradigms. Tasks were pre-tested to confirm that
participants obtained sufficient exposure to solve the presented
problems (Ormerod et al., 2002; Danek et al., 2014, 2016;
Öllinger et al., 2014). Solution rates in the matchsticks task
closely resemble previously reported rates (Schul et al., 2008;
Danek et al., 2016). Regarding the eight-coin task, an early study
by Ormerod et al. (2002) reports rather low solution rates of
below 2%. In recent studies on the eight-coin task, solution rates
between 25 and 40% are reported, which are similar to the 35%
reported here (Öllinger et al., 2013; Danek et al., 2016).
While we specifically chose the tasks in order to induce a
mental fixation, the preparation times might have been too short
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 February 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 72
fnhum-12-00072 February 22, 2018 Time: 14:48 # 9
Schönauer et al. Sleep and Insight
to induce a strong state of impasse. Instead of interrupting the
natural problem solving process, future studies should introduce
subjective measures to assess the stage of impasse during problem
solving more directly, allowing participants to think about
possible solutions until they state to have thoroughly exhausted
their ideas. Moreover, it has been shown that incubation time
positively correlates with incubation effects (Sio and Ormerod,
2009). Because it has been shown that the length of sleep can
impact the observed size of beneficial effects (Diekelmann et al.,
2012; Schönauer et al., 2014a) one might argue that our wake
and sleep incubation periods were too short for the expected
effect to emerge. However, it has been demonstrated that a nap
can actually yield comparable effects to a full night of sleep and
avoid confounds by circadian rhythm and sleep deprivation of
participants (Mednick et al., 2003; Lahl et al., 2008).
The current study used several different problem solving tasks
within the same session. It is possible that sleep has only a limited
amount of processing capability or that tasks interfered with
each other, and that the effect of sleep was therefore diminished
or canceled. On the other hand, using a number of different
remote associate problems in a RAT task or different memory
tasks does not necessarily abolish the effect of sleep (Cai et al.,
2009; Schönauer et al., 2015). Rather, we believe that using a
number of different problems should have increased sensitivity
of our test. Another factor that might have affected the influence
of sleep is the mild sleep restriction by 1 h in the night before
the experiment. However, we have used a similar procedure in
a previous study without impairing effects of sleep on memory
consolidation (Schönauer et al., 2014b), and even the highly
sensitive psychomotor vigilance task is unaffected by 2 × 2 h of
sleep loss (Banks and Dinges, 2007).
With the total sample size of N = 77, we are able to detect
effects above η2p = 0.1 with a statistical power of 80% and a
significance level of 5% in our experimental design. We can
therefore assume that based on the present data it is improbable
that an effect of a medium size of sleep on insight problem
solving exists. This effect size corresponds to what other studies
on cognitive functions of sleep have found (e.g., Schönauer et al.,
2014b). For large effects above η2p = 0.15, our design had a power
of 95%. η2 can roughly be interpreted as the percentage of total
variance explained by a factor. Analysis of achieved effect sizes
ηp
2 showed that all relevant effects found explained less than 1%
of variance. Effects of that size would require an N > 750 to
yield significant results with a power of 80%. For small effects
of around 1% explained variance, achieved statistical power
was 14%. The present experiments therefore cannot exclude the
existence of an effect of that size.
We tested the effect of incubation and sleep on solving insight
tasks that specifically require a restructuring of the problem
representation. During the experiment, we paid careful attention
to prevent effects of experimenter expectancy by presenting only
standardized written and recorded instructions. Neither sleep nor
incubation increased solution rates or the subjective experience
of sudden insight. Our study adds to accumulating evidence
that sleep does not provide a more suitable environment for
problem solving than the wake state. The main function of
the reorganization of memory content during sleep might thus
lie instead in the extraction of common features of multiple
experiences.
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